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Key Messages 
 
• A Global Carbon Budget is the total estimated cumulative CO2 that the world can emit while staying 
within a certain global temperature target, e.g. 1.5C, 2C 
• To align national climate ambition with both Article 2 (1.5C & 2C temperature target) and Article 4 
(carbon neutrality by 2050) of the Paris Agreement, countries can develop a national carbon budget 
consistent with a Global Carbon Budget, based on an “effort sharing methodology” 
• On its own, a net-zero emission target (e.g. in 2050) may not align with a Global Carbon Budget 
• For governance purposes, national carbon budgets can be sub-divided into time periods (e.g. 5 years) 
and allocated to sectors (e.g. transport, buildings, public sector, etc.). This allocation process needs to 
be analytically robust, transparent, and involve wide stakeholder consultation 
• In this document, we propose an approach to building a national carbon budget for Ireland based on 




Two articles of the Paris Agreement are particularly relevant to countries as they seek to mitigate their impact 
on global warming. Article 2 sets a target for long-term temperature stabilisation, seeking to hold the 
increase in global average temperature to “well below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels, while pursuing efforts 
to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C”. Article 4 includes a target to “peak greenhouse gases (GHGs) as 
soon as possible” and thereafter to achieve “rapid reductions” in emissions so that sources of emissions are 
balanced by sinks (i.e. achieving net zero emissions) in the second half of the 21st century. Despite the 
ratification of the Paris Agreement, there is no political or scientific consensus on precisely how these targets 
should be translated into national decarbonisation trajectories. As a result, countries are developing and 
setting their own carbon reduction strategies in different ways: increasingly, countries are implementing net-
zero targets for mid-century. Although consistent with Article 4, given the linear relationship between 
warming and cumulative net emissions of long-lived GHGs, net-zero target dates only specify when 
temperatures are stabilised, but not at what temperature. To comply with Paris Agreement temperature 
goals, international and national climate action policy must have regard to cumulative reductions in GHG 
emissions, not just single year targets. Broadly, this requires a carbon budget approach. 
 
In this discussion paper we review some of the ways that a carbon budget approach has been used in climate 
action policy. One approach is based on developing a so-called Climate Science Carbon Budget derived from 
a Global Carbon Budget (GCB) associated with a particular temperature goal and an equitable effort-sharing 
approach to share the GCB. This is contrasted with other approaches including national frameworks for 
climate policy such as the UK’s net zero emissions by 2050 where the carbon budgets are for a shorter time 
period (i.e. 5 years). We call this latter approach Climate Policy Carbon Budgets, that is carbon budgets that 
aren’t derived from a global temperature target, but instead from national decarbonisation trajectories. This 
discussion paper also explores approaches to developing decarbonisation pathways for Ireland which are 
consistent with the Paris Agreement using a carbon budget approach. This discussion paper outlines a broad 
approach to generating a national long-term climate science carbon budget for Ireland and translating it into 
five-year sectoral carbon budgets. The process for developing such carbon budgets will require an 
appropriate set of robust energy system modelling tools, that are iteratively developed and examined, 
together with an extensive stakeholder engagement process. This discussion paper concludes with some 
reflections on the governance arrangements for setting, monitoring, and reviewing carbon budgets. 
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1 Introduction 
The near linear relationship between cumulative CO2 
emissions and global temperature warming, means that 
the remaining cumulative amount of CO2 which can be 
emitted to stay within a global temperature limit can be 
quantified. This is the Global Carbon Budget (GCB) (see 
Table 1) and this forms the scientific basis of Article 2 of 
the Paris Agreement, that is keeping global average 
temperatures “well below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels, 
while pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 
1.5 °C”.  
Article 4 adds to Article 2 of the Paris Agreement, while 
both aim to limit global warming, Article 4 is focused upon 
the net-zero target, by stating that global peaking of GHGs 
should be as soon as possible, so as to achieve a balance 
between anthropogenic emissions by sources and 
removals by sinks of GHGs in the second half of this 
century. Article 4 also states that this target should be 
achieved on the basis of equity and that developed 
countries should take the lead in climate mitigation.     
The Paris Agreement does not prescribe a single GCB, nor 
does it indicate how countries should determine their 
national carbon budgets. Adherence with both Articles 2 
and 4 of the Paris Agreement will require a transparent 
and equitable method for developing a national carbon 
budget as an allocation from the GCB, notwithstanding 
the challenges that “the more a national target is derived 
from the global situation, the less it will take account of 
national circumstances, and vice versa”  [1].
 
Box 1: What is the Global Carbon Budget and how is it related to global warming? 
The Global Carbon Budget (GCB) is defined as the future (or remaining) cumulative CO2 emissions consistent with a 
given warming limit [2]. Climate modelling studies have established a robust near-linear relationship between 
global warming and cumulative carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions since industrialization [2]. The Transient Climate 
Response to cumulative carbon Emissions (TCRE) metric was developed to represent this connection. Essentially, 
the TCRE estimates for every 42 GtCO2 ( approx. the global annual CO2 emissions ) emitted, the global temperature 
will increase by between 0.009°C to 0.011°C [3]. 
Since the Paris Agreement, a lot of analysis has been undertaken to understand what the remaining GCB is, 
consistent with a given warming limit. The TCRE was used in the IPCC 1.5°C Special Report in 2018 to develop Table 
1. To have a 67% chance of limiting temperatures to 1.5°C, the remaining global carbon budget from 2018 onwards 
is between -500 and 1,340 GtCO2, with 420 GtCO2 the most probable GCB. The uncertainty is largely due to climate 
cycle feedbacks, and non-CO2 GHG emissions. The quantity of the GCB is also dependent on the amount of 
overshoot (if any) towards a temperature warming limit. Table 1 assumes no overshoot, as the TCRE is only applied 
up to peak warming temperature. 
Temperature limit target Probability of remaining below limit Remaining Carbon Budget ( GtCO2 ) 
1.5°C 67% 420 (-500 to 1,340) 
1.5°C 50% 580 (-340 to 1,500) 
2°C 67% 1,170 (250 to 2,090) 
2°C 50% 1,500 (580 to 2,420) 
Table 1: Global Carbon Budgets and Uncertainties [3] Remaining Global Carbon Budgets from 2018 with associated 
probability of remaining within the given temperature limit. Given values are centre estimate, bracket values 
represent minimum and maximum (i.e. uncertainty range). Negative values indicate CO2 emission limits reached  
The conceptual simplicity of TCRE and of carbon budgets led to the prominent presentation of these concepts in 
the Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) [4], [5].      
Looking ahead, the Sixth Assessment Report (AR6) of the IPCC will again review the GCB and perform a “global 
stocktake” in 2023, to inform and support nations as they update and enhance their mitigation actions, and to 
enhance international cooperation for climate action [6]. The latest climate models suggest higher climate 
sensitivity than previously thought, meaning additional warming is expected over the twenty-first century [7].  
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This paper grapples with the challenge of formulating a 
national decarbonisation strategy for Ireland, which is 
consistent with the two relevant Paris Agreement articles. 
Section 2 of this paper expands on the science of carbon 
budgets and discusses the allocation of the GCB to 
different countries (so-called effort-sharing approaches). 
Section 3 contrasts this approach with one where short-
term carbon budgets are determined by long-term 
decarbonisation targets, specifically net-zero targets. 
Section 4 analyses a number of country case studies for 
their approach to setting mitigation targets and carbon 
budgets. Section 5 then discusses an approach to setting a 
long-term carbon budget for Ireland, and a methodology 
for translating this into five-year carbon budgets and 
allocating carbon budgets to different sectors. Finally, 
Section 6 discusses open questions and factors relating to 
the science-policy interface. 
 
 
2 Climate Science Carbon Budgets 
A large part of international climate negotiations have 
revolved around how to equitably share the GCB, or the 
‘carbon-quota pie’, across countries. We introduce the 
term Climate Science Carbon Budgets as a term to 
describe this process, starting with a global temperature 
target and GCB implied from climate science, and using an 
effort-sharing methodology to allocate a long-term 
carbon budget to an individual country (See Figure 4). 
National long-term carbon budgets derived in this way are 
quantified for CO2 only, based on the simple linear 
relationship between cumulative emissions of CO2 and 
global temperature (see Box 1). Since all GHGs contribute 
to global warming [8] two broad methods have been 
developed to account for non-CO2 GHG emissions in 
climate mitigation policy. The established method 
involves converting other GHGs into a CO2 equivalent 
metric (GWP100); however, a more recent metric that 
treats non-CO2 GHGs as a separate category (GWP*) has 
been developed (See Box 2). 
 
Climate change is a classical “commons problem”, where 
the negative effects of emissions are shared across the 
world. This underlies the historic difficulty in agreeing 
national climate targets. There are large variations in per-
capita CO2 emissions, both annually and historically, 
across different nations, with high levels of emissions 
typically associated with high economic development. 
However, the negative effects of climate change will be 
felt at different levels of severity by all nations and the 
effects are expected to sustain for future generations. This 
inequality has not been resolved.  
Rationing or allocating the remaining GCB between 
countries can be a sensitive topic – should we focus on the 
remaining carbon budget only or also take into account 
historical emissions and fully apply the polluter pays 
principle? In addition, should we allocate on the basis of a 
country’s wealth or also take into account other factors 
that determine each country’s effort-sharing ability (i.e. 
should we include differences based on fuel resources, 
vulnerability to climate change, human rights issues, 







   
There are several approaches proposed to determine how to downscale the global carbon budget to determine national 
carbon emission budgets. Some of the main effort-sharing approaches include the following:  
 
• Grandfathering or inertia - prior annual emissions increase future emission entitlements so that a transition 
is feasible for all countries.  
• Equality – the remaining global carbon budget is shared equally among the global population. 
• Brazilian Rule Historical – historical emissions are used in deriving the equitable share of the all-time GCB; 
some countries are in ‘carbon debt’ (e.g. Ireland is in debt to a 1.5°C per capita GCB). 
• Contraction & Convergence - where national per-capita emissions converge to a global average and 
emissions then contract at the same rate to net zero following global average pathways.  
• Ability to pay – based on the ability to afford to reduce emissions. 
• Development rights - considers both responsibility and capability; aims to reach a dignified level of 
sustainable human development for all.  
• Cost-optimal – considers the least-cost decarbonisation options for the global energy system [11]. 
 
To contribute to international climate negotiations, 
different effort-sharing approaches (or rules) have been 
used by researchers to enable an equitable approach to 
allocate the GCB across countries. Different effort-sharing 
methodologies influence the resulting carbon budget. 
Some approaches lead to what might be called politically 
unlikely outcomes, for example the Brazilian rule where 
developed countries with high historical emissions are 
allocated a negative carbon budget, a consequence of the  
equity principle underlying the effort-sharing approach. 
Approaches requiring extreme sudden changes may not 
be politically or practically feasible and countries will likely 
choose an effort-sharing methodology which suits their 
own ambitions. This highlights the need and challenge of 
a globally harmonised approach. Extensive discussions in 
forums such as the UNFCCC are likely to be needed to 
share the decarbonisation effort transparently and 
equitably. It is likely that broad framework of the 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) will play a role in 
these discussions.  
 
Box 2: The Global Warming Potential (GWP) metric  
Each GHG has a unique lifetime in the atmosphere and a different warming potential. In an effort to make the 
global warming potential of different GHGs easily comparable, the Global Warming Potential (GWP) metric is 
used. The GWP of CO2 is 1, which is the benchmark that other more or less potent GHGs are measured. The 
GWP of different gases is commonly compared over 20 years and 100 years.   
 
Emissions reporting under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) now 
requires the use of 100-year Global Warming Potential (GWP100) to account for all gases as carbon dioxide 
equivalent (CO2eq) quantities. GWP defines the cumulative impacts that the emission of 1 kg CH4 or N2O could 
have on the planetary energy budget relative to 1 kg reference CO2 gas over a certain period of years [9]. 
 
A new usage of GWP, denoted GWP*, allows emissions of short-lived and long-lived climate pollutants (SLCP & 
LLCPs) to be more consistently expressed within a single metric by equating a change in the emission rate of an 
SLCP as equivalent to a single emissions pulse of a long-lived pollutant.  
 
When discussing cumulative emissions of CO2 and non-CO2 emissions, there is no cumulative GWP metric. The 
concept of an “emissions budget” cannot be extended to CO2eq emissions as conventionally calculated [10]. 
 
The concept of CO2eq emissions is deeply embedded in climate policy. Relating emissions using GWP* allows 




   
 
3 Climate Policy Carbon Budgets 
In contrast to the approach described in the previous 
section where a global carbon budget is used to calculate 
a carbon budget for an individual country along with an 
effort-sharing methodology, Climate Policy Carbon 
Budgets are developed by countries where the long term 
carbon budget is derived from national decarbonisation 
trajectories. For example, under the Climate Change Act 
2008, the United Kingdom legislated for an 80% reduction 
in GHG emissions by 2050 relative to 1990 levels, which 
was subsequently used to establish five-year carbon 
budgets to provide short term goals aligned with a long 
term target. More recently, the UK has increased their 
long-term ambition and legislated for a net-zero target for 
2050, which has decreased the UK’s five-year carbon 
budget quantities. However, the UK’s long-term 
cumulative carbon budget to 2050 is not defined and no 
effort-sharing methodology is applied a national total 
carbon budget, so its share of the ‘carbon-quota pie’ is not 
explicitly derived. Section 4.4 reviews in more detail the 
UK process of developing and governing carbon budgets.  
 
The EU has also taken a Climate Policy Carbon Budget 
approach. As part of the climate and energy policy 
framework for 2020, member states agreed on a 20% 
reduction target in GHG emissions outside the emissions 
trading scheme (ETS) relative to 2005 levels. These non-
ETS GHG emissions broadly cover emissions from 
transport, buildings, agriculture, and low energy intensive 
industry. Member states agreed on binding annual 
emission allocations (AEAs) in an effort-sharing 
agreement (Decision 406/2009/EC) for the period 2013-
2020. The total amount of AEAs effectively provided each 
member state with a non-ETS GHG budget for this period, 
which aggregated non-ETS CO2 emissions and non-CO2 
GHG emissions using the GWP100 metric. The EU adopted 
the same approach for the 2030 target for non-ETS GHG 
emissions (Regulation 2018/842), by setting AEAs for each 
year in the period 2021-2030 for all member states. The 
effort-sharing of each member state is based upon 
GDP/capita, which is then adjusted to reflect cost-
effectiveness. The EU has recently agreed an increased 
2030 ambition of a 55% reduction in GHG emissions in the 
context of legislating for a 2050 net-zero GHG target. 
In both these examples from the UK and EU, Climate Policy 
Carbon Budgets have been effectively used to flexibly 
deliver different decarbonisation rates within a multi-
annual time window. They can also be reviewed on an 
ongoing basis to consider greater ambition and/or 
mitigation potential from technological progress. 
However, in the context of the Paris Agreement, if 
national long-term ambition is aligned only with Article 4 
(net-zero target), alignment with Article 2 (long-term 
temperature stabilisation) is not guaranteed. For a 
detailed explanation of why see the following Section 3.1. 
To date, most national long-term decarbonisation targets 
have not been derived from a given temperature target or 
global carbon budget, nor do they explicitly consider 
effort-sharing approaches to equitably sharing the GCB. 
Because Climate Policy Carbon Budgets are not formed in 
a way which states a share of the ‘carbon-quota pie’, they 
tend to be non-compliant with Article 2 of the Paris 
Agreement [12].  
 
An example of the implications of using a Climate Policy 
Carbon Budget approach can be seen in analysis of the 
first round of Nationally Determined Contributions 
(NDCs), which were a key part of the Paris Agreement. If 
all first round NDCs were fully implemented, there is a 
67% probability that the global average temperature 
would increase by 2.9°C–3.4°C by 2100 [13]. The NDC 
registry shows that none of 196 member states explicitly 
defined a cumulative national carbon budget in their NDC 
target, although both Armenia and Costa Rica have 
defined emission budgets up to 2050. Furthermore, many 
NDC target typologies are used [14], some of which are 
non-quantitative and unmeasurable.  
 
An important difference between Climate Policy Carbon 
Budgets and Climate Science Carbon Budgets is that the 
former are often defined in terms of carbon dioxide 
equivalent (CO2eq), which makes an equivalence between 
CO2 and non-CO2 GHG emissions (see Box 2), something 






   
  
3.1 Relationship between net-zero GHG targets and carbon budgets 
 
Article 4 of the Paris Agreement includes an objective to 
achieve a balance between anthropogenic GHG emissions 
by sources and removals by sinks in the second half of this 
century. This is increasingly referred to as a net-zero GHG 
target. Over 100 countries are currently considering a 
2050 net-zero GHG targets as a long-term mitigation 
target [15]. The EU is proposing a net-zero GHG target by 
2050 under the EU Green Deal, which is yet to be 
enshrined in law [16]. Currently only UK, France, Sweden, 
New Zealand, Hungary and Denmark have set legally-
binding net-zero targets [16]. 
 
A key insight from climate modelling is that limiting the 
global mean temperature rise to 1.5°C above pre-
industrial levels requires that global GHG emissions must 
reach net-zero by between 2045 and 2060 [17], while also 
requiring high levels of short-term ambition and an 
“overshoot”. In a climate modelling context, an overshoot 
is defined as “the dependence of the magnitude and 
duration of possible temporary exceedance of 
temperature targets” [18].  
 
However, achieving net-zero is a necessary but not 
sufficient requirement for meeting Paris Agreement 
ambitions, specifically the temperature stabilisation 
target (Article 2). This is because different possible 
emissions trajectories between now and the net-zero 
date, and the level of negative emissions, thereafter, lead 
to very different cumulative CO2 emissions and therefore 
climate forcing. Figure 1 illustrates this point, showing 
three different decarbonisation trajectories which achieve 
net-zero by 2050. However, the temperature rise 
associated with the “late action” trajectory is double that 
of the “early action” trajectory. Hence, for Article 2 and 
the temperature stabilisation target, the path to net zero 




   
 
Figure 1: Illustrative decarbonisation trajectories to 2050: each pathway above reaches the same 2050 goal of net-zero 
CO2 emissions, but in the Late Action pathway, cumulative emissions are double that of the Early Action pathway, 
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4 How do different countries use carbon budgets? 
This section reviews a number of countries which use or are planning to use carbon budgets. 
 
4.1 France 
France’s long term decarbonisation plan establishes a 
linear trajectory toward a net zero GHG target in 2050 
[19]. The governance of achieving this target makes use of 
short term (4-5 year) carbon budgets, which are economy 
wide and sectorally disaggregated. The French 
government legislated for carbon budgets via the Energy 
Transition for Green Growth Act in 2015. The Act contains 
a net zero emissions target by 2050 across all GHGs. The 
short-term sectoral carbon budgets are legally binding for 
the public sector only [20]. 
 
Inspired by the UK’s independent Committee on Climate 
Change (CCC), France set up its equivalent Haut Conseil 
pour le Climat in May 2019, with a purpose to provide an 
independent perspective on the government's climate 
policy, issue advice on five-year carbon budgets, and assist 
in the implementation of France’s national low-carbon 
strategy (SNBC) which sets out an economic 
decarbonisation roadmap. 
 
The first SNBC, published in 2015, defined the first three 
sectoral and national carbon budgets for France for the 
periods 2015-2018, 2019-2023 and 2024-2028. The first 
carbon budget was only for a 4-year period, but following 
that, all carbon budgets are over five-years. The 2015-
2018 carbon budget was exceeded by 62 MtCO2eq or 14% 
[21]. In a review of the first carbon budget, chair of the 
Haut Conseil pour le Climat, Prof. Corinne Le Quéré 
remarked that “the initial efforts are worthy, but they are 
clearly insufficient and have not produced the expected 
results” [21]. In setting carbon budgets, France has 
adopted a Climate Policy Carbon Budgets approach, it has 
not used a global carbon budget or effort-sharing 
approach. 
 
4.2 New Zealand 
 
In November 2019, the New Zealand government 
introduced the Climate Change Response (Zero Carbon) 
Amendment Act [22] to legislate for carbon budgets and 
introducing a legally binding 2050 net-zero GHG target.  
 
The Climate Change Commission of New Zealand was 
established in December 2019 to provide independent, 
evidence-based policy advice to help New Zealand 
transition to a zero emissions economy. At the time of 
writing, New Zealand has not yet agreed national carbon 
budget quantities. The first carbon budget period will be 
2022-2025 and every five years thereafter. 
New Zealand have declared their net-zero GHG target will 
exclude biogenic methane; however, they have a separate 
target to reduce biogenic methane emissions by 24–47% 
below 2017 levels by 2050 [23]. New Zealand has a large 
agricultural sector which emits more methane as a share 
of total GHG (38%) than the OECD average (9%).  
 
Despite aiming to achieve Article 4 of the Paris Agreement 
(Net-Zero by 2050), because New Zealand’s cumulative 
carbon budget, GCB, or effort sharing methodology is not 
defined, the country can be said to be using a Climate 
Policy Carbon Budget. 
 
4.3 Denmark 
Danish climate law does not establish a national carbon 
budget. Instead, it sets legally-binding targets to reduce 
GHG emissions by 70% in 2030 compared to 1990 levels 
and to becoming a climate neutral society by no later than 
2050  [24]. The targets are part of the 2020 Climate Act 
which also strengthens Denmark’s existing 
independent Danish Council on Climate Change, sets 
annual climate reporting obligations by government to the 
parliament, commits Denmark to international climate 
engagement, and requires periodic national climate target 




   
As part of their input to the Climate Act, The Danish 
Council on Climate Change recommended that the climate 
targets set by the Climate Act should translate to a long-
term national carbon emission budget of 325-425 Mt 
CO2[25]; the range is due to range in the GCB, which is 
420-570 GtCO2. While both GCBs aim to limit global 
warming to 1.5°C with a 67% probability, the range in GCB 
is due to uncertainty in additional warming which has 
already occurred. This national carbon budget is 
calculated based on the effort-sharing equality principle, 
with a population of around 0.075% of the world's 
population, Denmark can emit 0.075% of the GCB. 
Denmark’s long-term carbon budget of 325-425 Mt 
CO2[25] is then converted by the Danish council on climate 
change to include all GHGs, this value is 325-525 Mt 
CO2eq[25]. The assessment uses a hybrid of Climate 
Science Carbon Budgets, as the national carbon budget is 
based upon a GCB and an effort-sharing methodology and 
Climate Policy Carbon Budgets, as all GHGs are considered 
(see Box 2).  
 
According to the Climate Act, the government must set a 
national climate target every five years with a ten-year 
perspective [24]. The first climate plan should be prepared 
in 2020. This climate plan should focus on the 2030 target 
and also set an indicative target for 2025. Following this, a 
new climate plan should be prepared every five years. This 
means that the next climate plan should be prepared in 
2025 with the aim of reaching the 2030 and 2035 targets. 
The overview of this process is outlined below [25]. The 
Danish Council on Climate Change recommends a 
framework with single year targets set every five years. 
 
 
Figure 2 Denmark’s Climate Council framework of the climate policy [25]  This schematic outlines the 10-year Climate 
Plans 
 
Ireland’s recently approved Programme for Government 
stated about setting carbon budgets “In setting the 
second carbon budget for 2026-2030, we will not yet be in 
a position to identify all the emerging technologies, 
changing scientific consensus or policies to meet our full 
ambition. This will require a further allocation within the 
overall carbon budget, subject to intense evaluation. This 
approach, which mirrors the Danish model, will be 
reflected in the Climate Action (Amendment) Bill and in 
future iterations of the Climate Action Plan.”  
 
In Denmark however, the approach is not based on carbon 
budgets. In their input to the Climate Act, the Danish 
Council on Climate Change recommends a framework 
with single year targets set every five years (I.e. setting a 
2035 target in 2025, a 2040 target in 2030, etc.). Although, 
using carbon budgets is an option, the Danish Council on 
Climate Change considers that the increased complexity of 
these budgets and the mixed experience from other 





   
4.4 United Kingdom 
 
The UK was the first country to introduce legally binding 
carbon budgets in 2008. The UK government are advised 
by the Committee on Climate Change (CCC), who 
recommend sectoral and total quantities for five-year 
carbon budgets, 12 years in advance. The carbon budgets 
account for both CO2 and non-CO2 GHG emissions. In 
calculating the UK’s targets, the CCC stated they do not 
start from an assumption that the world will meet the 
Paris Agreement's temperature goal. Instead, they have 
identified a UK target that they say is within reach and best 
supports an increase in global effort, consistent with 
bringing the expected temperature rise down from the 
current trajectory [26]. Using the term we introduced in 
Section 3, the UK has a Climate Policy Carbon Budget. 
The UK’s carbon budget trajectory follows a simple near 
linear pathway towards a net-zero GHG emissions target 
by 2050. However, as already stated this linear myopic 
approach is not informed by an optimal long-term 
scenario based on a GCB effort-sharing approach. Such an 
approach was investigated by Pye et.al, who showed that 
for more ambitious targets, a convex curve rather than a 
linear trajectory was more optimal [27].  
 
The CCC monitors progress with annual reports, conducts 
and commissions analysis on climate policy topics (such as 
infrastructure needs, economic impacts, forestry, sectoral 




Figure 3: UK’S Five-Year Carbon Budget Trajectory [11]  
 
Due to the longer history of UK’s carbon budgets, there is 
a greater capacity to learn from their approach, therefore 
this section will cover in detail the setting and managing 
of UK’s national carbon budgets. The UK is currently in 
their third carbon budget (2018-2022). The first and 
second carbon budgets were successful as their net actual 
emissions were less than the emission budget by 1% and 
14% respectively [28]. International Aviation and Shipping 
(IAS) emissions are not currently included in the UK’s  
 
 
carbon budgets (current carbon budgets have a 120 
MtCO2eq/year allowance for IAS, see Figure 3). If IAS 
emissions are excluded in future carbon budgets then the 
UK will need negative emissions in 2050 to offset IAS 
emissions, so the UK can achieve net-zero GHG 2050 
target. Peatlands, which occupy 12% of UK land area [29] 
will be included into annual accounts from 2020, which 
will convert land use, land-use change & forestry (LULUCF) 






   
 
4.4.1 Modelling & governance – setting a budget 
The CCC provide detailed advice to the government 
regarding the future energy system and decarbonisation. 
This analysis includes an assessment of the investment 
and financing needs, technical innovation, evolution of 
societal or individual behaviours, timing of deliveries, co-
benefits, infrastructure and leadership by key actors [30]. 
To provide robust advice, the CCC obtains decarbonisation 
modelling results from a range of tools and organisations; 
a key modelling tool is UK TIMES [31]. The CCC are 95% 
confident that modelling uncertainty in projections 20 
years ahead is limited to 34% [33], this uncertainty is 
reduced with shorter projections. The 8% over-estimation 
in 2009 of UK’s second carbon budget (2013-2017) was 
mainly due to changing economic activity which was 
based on an eight-year projection. The amount of GHGs 
emitted is measured each year by the UK’s National 
Atmospheric Emissions Inventory (NAEI). The NAEI 
measure emissions data implied an uncertainty range of 
154 MtCO2eq in the second carbon budget from 2013 - 
2017 [33], which is a margin of error of 6%.  
 
4.4.2 Ex-post analysis 
The CCC provide feedback and ex-post analysis on 
decarbonisation polices. Three external factors that are 
isolated are economic activity, energy prices, and air 
temperature. This in turn helps the CCC to isolate the 
effectives of the combined policies and determine the 
policy gap. The policy gap looks at the difference between 
the outturn conditions (what happened) and the 
counterfactual conditions (forecast when carbon budget 
was set). The UK achieved their second carbon budget 
(2013- 2017) by 14% or 384 MtCO2eq. This achievement 
was largely due to an accounting change in the UK’s share 
of the Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS); the UK’s carbon 
budget accounts for both ETS and non-ETS emissions. The 
UK’s ETS allowances for the 2013-2017 period was set in 
2009 at 1,078 MtCO2eq. However, this was set before the 
EU ETS changes had been finalised and following 
legislation changes, this was revised downwards to 782 
MtCO2eq [33]. The reduction of emissions in the ETS 
sector created 296 MtCO2eq of “headroom” in the non-
ETS sector of the UK’s second carbon budget, which 
combined with the economic downturn, meant the UK 
easily achieved their second carbon budget. This 
highlights that carbon budgets are impacted by many 
factors, not just policy implementation. In this example, 
factors outside the UK’s control (the ETS) compensated for 
domestic policy underachievement, which was only 
brought to light by ex-post. Ex-post analysis is an essential 
component of effective carbon budget governance.  
 
4.4.3 Flexibilities 
The CCC analysis and target of net-zero by 2050 
recommend against reliance on flexibilities. After over 
performing of UK’s second carbon budget the CCC stated 
“Carrying over any surplus risks further papering over the 
cracks of not implementing satisfactory measures to put 
the UK on course to achieve its long-term and ambitious 
target of net zero by 2050.” However, the UK government 




Carry forward over-achievement from 
earlier budgets 
The Act allows for Government to carry forward overachievement from 
one carbon budget to the next. 
Carry back from later carbon budgets 
 
The Act allows for the Government to increase the carbon budget in one 
period with a corresponding tightening of the next carbon budget. This 
‘borrowing’ is limited to one per cent of the later carbon budget.  
Use international carbon credits (EU ETS) 
 
The Act allows for the purchase of international carbon credits to 
contribute to meeting carbon budgets but with a limit on the use of 
these credits set 18 months in advance of the relevant carbon budget  
Table 2: UK Carbon Budget Flexibilities [28]  
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5 A national decarbonisation strategy consistent with the Paris Agreement 
In this section, an approach for developing a carbon 
budget in an Irish context is outlined. The two broad 
approaches that have been described so far - Climate 
Science Carbon Budgets and Climate Policy Carbon 
Budgets - are compared (i.e.– See Figure 4). While both 
approaches have merits and have contributed in different 
ways to climate mitigation, a key difference is that a 
Climate Science Carbon Budget is informed by global 
climate modelling which informs global climate targets; by 
contrast, a Climate Policy Carbon Budget is not directly 
linked to global climate modelling. By consistent with the 
Paris Agreement, we mean compliance with both Articles 
2 (1.5°C and 2°C temperature limit) and Articles 4 (a 
balance between GHG sources and sinks by 2050). 
 
 
Figure 4 Flowchart to derive five-year carbon budgets The flowchart outlines the steps in the two approaches to obtain 
five-year carbon budgets. The left side represents the climate science approach and the right side represents the 
climate policy approach  
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5.1 Global carbon budget and effort sharing methodology 
 
The first step in using a carbon budget approach to align a 
decarbonisation strategy with the Paris Agreement is to 
choose a Global Carbon Budget and an effort sharing 
methodology to allocate a national long-term carbon 
budget. Section 2 provided an overview of the Global 
Carbon Budget (Box 1) and a summary of the main effort 
sharing methodologies.  
 
Since the choice of effort sharing methodology will 
influence what quantity of the Global Carbon Budget will 
be allocated nationally, many considerations are likely to 
influence this decision. These considerations could include 
climate justice, intergenerational equity, and how the 
Global Carbon Budget is likely to change over time as 
different countries achieve different levels of 
decarbonisation. How a national allocation of the Global 
Carbon Budget is defined, whether as a quantity of carbon 
or a % share of the total, could be consequential. If a 
national target is to be defined in terms of a global carbon 
budget, something to that be considered and agreed in 
advance is how (or whether) the national target is updated 
in response to changes in global decarbonisation progress. 
 
 
5.2 Inter-temporal and inter-sectoral national carbon budgets 
Once a national long-term carbon budget is established, 
the challenge is to allocate how to “spend” the budget, 
over time (giving a decarbonisation trajectory) and over 
different sectors. The national carbon budget can thus be 
allocated to short-term or “inter-temporal” carbon 
budgets (typically in five-year periods) and further 
subdivided by sector into “inter-sectoral” carbon budgets. 
A five-year national carbon budget timeline more closely 
aligns with elected government timelines than long term 
targets, a feature which will possibly add political 






Box 3: What are the benefits of using a carbon budget?  
From a global perspective, the use of carbon budgets can provide essential transparency and clarity on 
whether or not compliance with the Paris Agreement will be achieved. One of the innovations of the Paris 
Agreement was the instrument of NDCs, whereby individual countries conducted and published their own 
analysis on decarbonisation pathways. In the first round of NDCs, seventy-eight member states defined a 
mitigation target compared to a base year and eighty-seven member states used a reduction target 
compared to business as usual (BaU) scenario. A weakness with both of these methods is the lack of clarity 
of absolute emission limits that both pathways achieve. As outlined in Section 3.1, different emission 
pathways with different cumulative emissions will have very different implications for global warming. 
Without the specification of a carbon budget in a country’s NDC it is difficult to analytically aggregate the 
impact of the NDCs and to determine if their impact is consistent with the temperature target of the Paris 
Agreement. Carbon budgets provide some additional benefits to the common NDC emission target types. 
Despite the absolute emissions being transparent within carbon budgets, the effort-sharing methodology 





   
 
5.3 Ireland 
Previously, Ireland’s long-term national climate strategy 
was based on the 2015 National Climate Policy Position of 
an at least 80% reduction in energy related CO2 emissions 
by 2050 (compared to 1990) and “an approach to carbon 
neutrality in the agriculture and land-use sector, including 
forestry, which does not compromise capacity for 
sustainable food production”. The Climate Action Plan 
(2019) included a range of decarbonisation policy 
measures, a commitment to increase Ireland’s 
decarbonisation ambition to net-zero greenhouse gas 
emissions by 2050, an outline of a new governance regime 
of five-year carbon budgets, and a strengthening of the 
Climate Change Advisory Council (CCAC).  
 
The recently approved Programme for Government cited 
Denmark’s climate action model, which it recommended 
that Ireland mirrors (Section 4.3). If Ireland was to derive 
a national carbon budget based upon population similar 
to Denmark, then Ireland’s long-term carbon budget 
would be in the range 275 – 360 MtCO2, which complies 
with a 67% probability of limiting global temperature to 
1.5°C above pre-industrial temperatures (uncertainty due 
to additional warming which has already occurred). 
 
5.3.1 National long-term carbon budget 
This section describes in more detail some of the stages in 
setting a Climate Science Carbon Budget for Ireland. 
Developing carbon budgets for Ireland is an iterative 
process which will require extensive discussions on 
choices, exclusions, effort-sharing approach, issues and 
assumptions from all stakeholders to provide a 
transparent long-term carbon budget which can be easily 
absorbed by all stakeholders (Section 6 outlines some 
discussions for Ireland).  
As previously mentioned, the first step in determining a 
national carbon budget is to choose a GCB. Figure 5 shows 
two GCB associated from the IPCC for 1.5°C and 2°C. It is 
worth noting the very large difference that 0.5°C makes to 
these GCBs. Some preliminary results of assigning 
Ireland’s long-term carbon budget from these GCBs are 
shown in Table 4. We present a range of different 
numbers in this section to highlight the importance of the 
process of developing a carbon budget decarbonisation 
pathway.  
 
5.3.1.1 Effort sharing methodologies 
Two different national carbon budgets for Ireland are 
shown here based on two different effort sharing 
methodologies: the Regensburg Model and the Extended 
Smooth Pathway Model (ESPM). The Regensburg Model 
[27] is primarily based upon the Contraction and 
Convergence (C&C) approach, which is outlined in Section 
2. While the EPSM [2] is based on a weighted distribution 
of population, which is the equity approach outlined in 
Section 2,  and emissions which is the grandfathering 
approach outlined in Section 2. Both models are available 
to download at [34].  
 
The preliminary results indicate that if Ireland is to 
equitable comply with a 67% probability of limiting global 
warming to 1.5°C, then the maximum CO2 budget is 263 
MtCO2 using the Regensburg Model and 225 MtCO2 using 
the ESPM. These preliminary calculations do not include 
land use, international aviation and shipping (IAS) 
emissions, non-CO2 emissions or negative emissions i.e. 
net carbon emissions only.  
 
Ireland emits about 40 MtCO2/year [35] this means we can 
continue to emit at similar levels for 5 – 9 years until we 
exceed our fair-share of the remaining 1.5°C GCB (not 
including historical budget, in which Ireland is in ‘carbon 
debt’). The 67% probability of limiting global warming to 
2°C results are also shown below. To comply with the 2°C 
warming limit, Ireland can continue to emit at similar 
levels for 18 – 22 years until we exceed our fair-share of 




   
 
 
Effort-sharing methodology     
(and GCB) 
National Carbon Budget 
2020-2100 (MtCO2) 
Regensburg Model                    
(279 GtCO2) 
251-263 
Regensburg Model                     
(909 GtCO2) 
834 - 857 
ESPM                                     
(279 GtCO2) 
225 




Figure 5 Two GCB [3] which provide a 67% probability of limiting 
global warming to their respective warming targets.  
Table 4: Ireland’s Long-Term Carbon Budget using 
two GCB and two effort-sharing models [34] 
calculations applied to Ireland from 2020  
Ireland’s first 2050 climate target (an 80% reduction in CO2 
emissions and carbon neutrality in forestry and 
agriculture) and Ireland’s latest 2050 climate target (net-
zero GHG emissions) equate to two very different carbon 
budgets. Similarly, different carbon budgets arise from 
two 2030 targets: a 30% reduction in non-ETS GHG 
emissions (an EU derived target) and a 7% p.a. average 
GHG reduction from 2021-2030 (Programme for 
Government). Figure 6 outlines the four different 
potential carbon budgets arising from combining these 
different 2030 and 2050 targets. A key insight here is that 
greater levels of GHG reductions before 2030 (e.g. 7% p.a. 
reduction) leads to a significant overall reduction in 
Ireland’s longer term (i.e. 2021-2050) carbon budget. 
 
 


























EU target to 2030 + 80%
GHG reduction 2050
EU target to 2030 +Net-
Zero GHG 2050
PfG 2030 target + 80%
GHG reduction 2050







2021-2030 Carbon Budget 2031-2050 Carbon Budget
Non-ETS and ETS 2030 targets   PfG 2030 target
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5.3.2 National climate mitigation pathway to 2030 
Ireland’s 2021-2030 climate mitigation pathway is 
fundamental to Ireland’s long-term carbon budget. 
Ireland’s current legally binding non-ETS GHG emission 
targets from 2021-2030 and Europe’s 2.2% annual 
reduction of ETS GHG emissions from 2021-2030 can 
provide the foundation to forming Ireland’s carbon 
budgets up to 2030, in that complying with EU targets will 
be the minimum effort goal or maximum carbon budget. 
Ireland’s recent programme for government have agreed 
to a commitment of 7%/year on average reduction in 
overall GHG emissions from 2021 to 2030 (a 51% 
reduction over the decade) and to achieving net-zero 
emissions by 2050. Figure 7 below shows three carbon 
budgets, one carbon budget is from Non-ETS and ETS 2030 
targets, which are EU derived targets and two carbon 
budgets are from the PfG 2030 targets, one low carbon 
budget with annual consistent reductions and one high 
carbon budget which allows for increased emissions ( late 
action scenario ) but still complies with the PfG 2030 
target by having an average 7%/year GHG reduction and 
51% GHG reduction over the decade. 
 
  
Figure 7 Ireland’s 2030 targets and respective Carbon Budgets  
 
For Ireland to comply with the current 2030 EU targets 
(i.e. a 30% reduction), this would equate to a budget of 
533.4 MtCO2eq from 2021-2030. The new programme for 
government does not define a carbon or GHG budget, so 
with annually consistent reductions of 7%, the GHG 
budget would be approximately 428 MtCO2eq; however, 
in an extreme scenario it could be higher than EU 2030 
targets; this would happen if Ireland increased GHG 
emissions, then reduced GHG emissions at a maximum 
rate of 17%/year (see Figure 7 – Late Action). Although this  
 
High Budget scenario is very improbable, it is included 
here to show that a climate pathway based on an average 
annual reduction could still have a larger than allowable 
carbon budget, which would make a difference to levels of 
global warming. 
 
Based upon a 428 MtCO2eq budget (i.e. a 7% linear per 
annum reduction), the first 5-year carbon budget (2021-
2025) would be expected to be about 252 MtCO2eq and 
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MtCO2eq. According to the EPA if Ireland is to continue on 
a With Existing Measures (WEM) pathway to 2030, Ireland 
is likely to emit 644.76 MtCO2eq [36]. To comply with 
current EU 2030 targets (i.e. a 30% reduction) Ireland will 
need to emit 17% less GHG emissions compared to WEM. 
For Ireland to comply with an average 7%/year GHG 
reduction to 2030 target, between 14–34% less emission 
would be required compared to WEM. 
The Climate Action Plan 2019 provides higher detail in the 
Non-ETS sector emissions savings and the EU flexibilities 
up to 2030. Figure 8 below shows some sectoral division 
of the cumulative savings required in the 2021-2030 
period. Ireland also has a large LULUCF allowance, which 
can be used to offset emissions if forestry (carbon sinks) is 
planted. This information should be used in calculating 
five-year carbon budgets.  
 
 
Figure: 8 Climate Action Plan 2019, cumulative emission savings 2021-2030 [37]  
Further work on Ireland’s GCB effort-sharing and climate 
mitigation pathways up to 2070 was done by Glynn et al. 
2019 [38]. Thirty-eight scenarios were considered, and the 
GCB effort-sharing was based on equitable per capita 
shares (equality approach) of the remaining GCB. A range 
of national carbon budgets and scenario variants were 
used to account for uncertainty in climate mitigation 
policy choices. The results produced show a range of 
variation in optimal pathways with given budget 
constraints, with the 376 MtCO2 budget also showing a 
difference between early action and delayed action (i.e. 
starting in 2025) in Figure 9.
 
 
Figure 9: Energy system CO2 emissions pathways for Ireland [38]. The reference emissions pathway up to 2070 can be 




























   
 
The modelling results suggest that an optimum 
decarbonisation pathway for a cumulative carbon budget 
follows a convex trajectory shape rather than a linear 
trajectory [38]. Significant additional detail about the 




5.3.3 Ireland’s carbon budget governance 
Ireland’s carbon budget governance structure has not yet 
been fully implemented, nor has the inter-temporal and 
inter-sectoral ambition being quantified yet. Based on the 
Climate Action Plan 2019 and the anticipated new Climate 
Action Bill, a hypothetical governance structure is outlined 
in Figure 10. This outline is intended to stimulate 
discussion. Given the reach of carbon-based energy into 
all parts of Irish life and society, it is important that all 
stakeholders can have an input, so that Ireland’s carbon 
budget governance is transparent for all. The figure has 
colour coded organisations/activities depending on 













   
 
6 Discussion 
In this final section, we first briefly discussion the 
relationship between analytical energy modelling and the 
policy-making process, highlighting some of the principles 
and practices that can make this process more effective 
(section 6.1). Then we give a brief survey of a range of 
open issues related to the process of developing a carbon 
budget for Ireland (section 6.2). This section summarises a 
number of open questions and important considerations 
(accounting, technical, procedural) that we believe must 
be addressed if the process of forming a carbon budget is 
to be equitable and robust.  
 
6. 1 The energy policy-modelling interface
Robust quantitative analysis and information is an 
important ingredient in the energy and climate policy 
making process. But energy modelling should support the 
policy making process rather than determine its contents; 
the policy-making process is best served by being 
evidence-informed rather than evidence-based [39]. This 
means the interface between energy modelling and the 
policy making process should be an iterative one that 
incorporates regular review and feedback as new issues 
and questions emerge. 
 
According to the climate policy architecture put in place 
by the Paris Agreement, each nation takes responsibility 
for developing their own climate targets and climate 
mitigation pathway. Each country will take into account 
their own unique circumstances and will have their own 
combination of different energy system modelling tools 
and processes for developing policies, i.e. processes that 
include discussions between researchers, consultants and 
government to assess optimal and feasible national 
climate mitigation pathways. 
 
Mindful of this diversity, Strachan et. al, 2016 provide an 
idealised energy modelling-policy interface (Figure 11) 
that would capture insights from an expert user group 
based on a modelling platform (B), incorporate 
interdisciplinary external review by wider stakeholders 
(C), and comprehensive quality assurance, version control 
and documentation (D). These insights would be fed into 
future model improvements and applications by coupling 
model-development to funding and policy cycles (A). 
There are a broad set of viewpoints on the overall role of 
modelling in the policy process, studies that actually 
examine the energy modelling–policy interface 
acknowledge the weak links between provision of insights 
and policy-maker needs [40]. 
 
 







   
6.2 Open Issues 
 
6.2.1 Global carbon budget 
In this discussion paper we have created a distinction 
between Climate Policy Carbon Budgets and Climate 
Science Carbon Budgets. This distinction was made to 
explain different types of carbon budgets that have been 
devised and adopted by different countries. For countries 
to adhere to Article 2 of the Paris Agreement, i.e. “Holding 
the increase in the global average temperature to well 
below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts 
to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-
industrial levels” some use of a global carbon budget that 
is consistent with these targets will be required.  
 
However, this is not a simple process. As shown in Box 1, 
there are a number of global carbon budgets for different 
temperature targets (2°C or 1.5°C) and each of these 
targets has a range of carbon budgets associated with 
different probabilities (50%, 67%) of being achieved. 
Which of the global carbon budgets should Ireland 
choose? 
 
Once a carbon budget is chosen, the question arises of 
how an individual country (e.g. Ireland) apportions a share 
of that budget, i.e. what effort sharing methodology is 
used? Section 2 outlines the main effort sharing 
methodologies that have been used. Each effort sharing 
methodology and associated global carbon budget will 
provide different results. Which effort sharing 
methodology should Ireland choose?   
 
Furthermore, these carbon budgets are true for a point in 
time but will inevitably change over time as different 
countries perform differently. It should be made clear 
when adopting a global carbon budget, what will happen 
in the future as circumstances change [1],[2].  
 
Climate science carbon budgets are CO2 only, which is 
scientifically robust, while using an effort sharing 
methodology to equitably divide the GCB. Climate science 
carbon budgets do not include all GHGs, and therefore 
may require either separate non-CO2 GHG targets and/or 
the use of the GWP* metric. The particular share of non-
CO2 emissions in a country’s inventory of emissions will 
also affect the level of uncertainty for the overall carbon 
budget. 
 
Finally, like all science, climate science is constantly 
evolving, so provision should be made for changes that 
may arise because of this. 
 
 
6.2.2 National emission categories - what to include or exclude? 
In theory, a carbon budget will account for all activities in 
a country that produce or sequester carbon-based 
emissions. In practice, decisions will be made about what 
to include or exclude in a national carbon budget. The 
ramifications of these decisions could have big impacts on 
a national carbon budget. For example, activities with an 
international dimension such as aviation and shipping 
could represent a very large share of a national carbon 
budget. We outline some of the considerations and 
questions below. 
Should biogenic methane be included or excluded from the 
carbon budgets? This is a consequential question for 
Ireland. As shown in Figure 12, Ireland has a 21% share of 
GHG emissions from methane, which is one of the highest 
shares of non-C02 GHGs in the world. The OECD average is 
9%. If biogenic methane is included in a carbon budget, 
that will be proportionally less is available for other 
sectors. New Zealand has a 38% of GHG emissions 
methane, the highest in the world. New Zealand has taken 
the approach of not including biogenic methane in their 




   
 
Figure 12: type of GHG emissions by OECD nation (source: OECD) 
How should emissions associated with land-use be 
accounted for? Because Greenhouse Gas emissions 
associated with LULUCF can contribute to global warming, 
they are included in the Paris Agreement, which (in Article 
4) cites the target of “a balance between anthropogenic 
emissions by sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse 
gases in the second half of this century”. EU legislation 
also addresses LULUCF emissions with a number of key 
policy changes coming into effect during 2021-2030. 
While compliance will be required with EU legislation, the 
timing of these regulations might occur later than 2021. 
For example, the scope of LULUCF will extend to include 
all wetlands from 2026 [41]. Therefore the question arises, 
when should LULUCF be included in a carbon budget for 
Ireland? 
 
Should international aviation and shipping (IAS) sector be 
included? Currently, international aviation and shipping 
are not included in Ireland’s national emissions accounting 
by the EPA. This is consistent with many other countries. 
To date, efforts at decarbonising international aviation 
and shipping have been through international agreements 
led by industrial representation of these industries. UK 
and Denmark, two countries that have legislated for long-
term net zero climate targets, do not currently include IAS 
in their targets; however, both countries plan to include 
IAS in later budgets. For Ireland, international shipping 
emissions are very small whereas international aviation 
emissions are very large.  
 
How should the ETS and non-ETS sectors be incorporated 
a long-term carbon budget? Until the year 2030, Ireland’s 
emissions are subject to separate ETS and non-ETS targets, 
though there is some flexibility permitted in using 
allocations from the ETS for the non-ETS. For the period 
after 2030, there is at present no mandatory targets for 
either ETS and non-ETS sectors. Therefore, how or 
whether the ETS/non-ETS distinction will be dealt with 
post 2030 remains open. 
 
What flexibilities will be designed into the system? The UK 
has allowed for 3 carbon budget flexibilities which are 
outlined in section 4.4.4. What flexibilities should be used 
in achieving Ireland’s carbon budgets? Ireland currently 
has Non-ETS GHG budget flexibilities within the EU. 
Ireland’s Climate Action Plan accounts for the non-ETS 
GHG budget flexibilities. Current non-ETS flexibilities 
include banking, borrowing, and buying and selling 
between Member States, other flexibilities include access 
to EU ETS allowances and credits from the land use sector. 
 
6.2.3 Governance 
Many questions remain about the process of forming, 
agreeing, monitoring, managing compliance, and updating 
carbon budgets. A transparent plan on the steps and 
stakeholders involved in setting overall and sectoral 
carbon budgets will be necessary. Some of the issues 
highlighted in Section 6.1 will be pertinent here, e.g. how 
and when will formal analytical modelling be used and 
how will it be balanced with discussions and negotiations  
between departments? Additional questions that arise 
include: should sectoral carbon budget be set at the 
beginning of a carbon budget along with the carbon 
budget or should allowances be set every year to provide 
more flexibility? Who is accountable for reducing 
emissions? Who is accountable to monitor progress and 













Other Nitrous oxide Methane Carbon dioxide
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6.2.4 Consistency with EU climate goals 
While the topic of consideration here is a national carbon 
budget for Ireland, it will be important for any Irish 
decarbonisation policy goals to be consistent with current, 
planned or anticipated EU climate goals. Ireland’s track 
record on compliance with EU climate and energy goals is 
poor. To achieve compliance with 2020 climate and 
energy targets, Ireland will likely be required to purchase 
of credits which will divert resources from investment that 
would achieve decarbonisation. Further future non-
compliance would be similarly costly. 
 
Recently, the EU goals for 2030 of a 40% reduction in 
overall GHG emissions (compared to 1990) was increased 
to a 55% reduction. For Ireland, the old target (a 40% 
reduction) was converted to a national target of a 30% 
reduction, with a number of flexibility measures 
permitted. Under The Green New Deal proposal, this 2030 
target was to be increased to either 50% or 55%. Recent 
discussion in the European Parliament have called for 
increasing the 2030 target to a 60% or 65% reduction, 
although there is not consensus on this change. Given 
these dynamics, it will be important for any Irish national 
carbon budget to have consideration for a pathway that is 
consistent with these more ambitious medium-term goals 
or have a mechanism to adjust 
national/temporal/sectoral carbon budgets when 
circumstances change. 
 
The EU’s 2050 long-term strategy is “to be climate-neutral 
by 2050 – an economy with net-zero greenhouse gas 
emissions”. Analysis underpinning this long-term goal 
uses global carbon budgets (from AR5) that are consistent 
with global temperature targets of “below 2°C or 1.5°C”; 
however, the long-term target is still framed in terms of a 
single year (i.e. 2050) rather than a cumulative amount of 
emissions (i.e. a carbon budget). This could change when 
revised global carbon budget estimates from AR6 are 
released.  
 
6.2.5 National energy system circumstances 
The headline goals of The Paris Agreement are the 1.5 
degree and 2-degree global temperature targets, but 
achievement of these goals is also acknowledged to rely 
on “different national circumstances”, i.e. what is feasible. 
For the energy system, assumptions about resources, 
costs, and capabilities will influence what is feasible and at 
what cost. Some of these factors are inherently uncertain 
(e.g. the future price of oil), however other factors are well 
within the domain of national decision-making and will be 
influenced and policy-making and policy supports. Some 
factors include: the range of carbon tax up to 2030, the 
projected amount of data centres, the domestic bioenergy 
resource, the potential for district heating, the potential 
for carbon capture & storage (CCS), offshore wind 
capacity, etc. 
 
6.2.6 Social discount rate 
Economic evaluations of future investments use a % 
discount rate as standard practice. The social discount 
rate is a way of comparing the future value of an 
investment with the same investment today. The higher 
the discount rate, the lower the perceived value of future 
investments. Discount rates are used as an evaluation 
metric. They are composed of consideration of risk and 
the changing value of money. The outcomes of most 
evaluations are extremely sensitive to discount rate 
values. Therefore, transparency about what the discount 
rate is and how it was calculated are very important. 
Ireland’s social discount rate is recommended at 3.7% or 
rounded up to 4%, which is based upon the Social Time 
Preference Rate (STPR) equation using methodology from 
[42]  based on calculations from  [43]. The equation has 
two components. The time preference component 
comprising pure social time preference (δ) and 
catastrophic risk (L). The wealth effect component, where 
µ is the elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption 
and g is the rate of per-capita consumption growth. 
 
Energy systems modelling analysis on Ireland’s carbon 
budget, which varied social discount rates, showed that 
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Ireland’s first two carbon budgets varied by up to 20%, 
when a social discount rate between 3% - 7% was applied 
[44]. This is a significant change and therefore the social 
discount rate is a highly sensitive variable and it should be 
openly discussed.  
 
The UK Greenbook states “Policies or projects which 
involve long term effects may require a different approach. 
This can be particularly important for policies expected to 
have significant environmental effects” [42]. The UK 
Greenbook has set a default social discount rate of 3.5% 
in the UK. The UK recommended discount rate for risk to 
health and life is 1.5%. The health social discount rate is 
applied to projects which will affect a person’s quality of 
life known as Quality Adjusted Life Years (QALYs), which 
combines both longevity and level of health in a single 
measure. It is worth discussing – does climate change 
effect our longevity or quality of life? Applying the same 
to Ireland, by excluding the ‘wealth effect’ the social 
discount rate of 3.7% would fall to 1.4%.  
Human rights and ethical debates around 
intergenerational considerations have revolved around 
discounting future generation in climate mitigation 
projects. Ireland’s time preference value is focused on 
values around 1% [43], this means if Ireland is to consider 
future generations to have equal value to the current 
generation, then the social discount rate applied should 
be about 2.7%. 
 
Combining both health and intergenerational 
considerations, would mean Ireland’s social discount rate 
should fall to about 0.4%. What value or range of values 
should be set for Ireland’s social discount rate?  
 
This question is partly being addressed by Action 9 of the 
Climate Action Plan “Reform the Public Spending Code to 
increase the shadow price of carbon and introduce more 
robust consideration of climate impacts in project 
appraisal”. As part of this, the Irish government recently 
published updated guidance on using discount rates.  
 
 
6.2.7 Consumption based emissions 
The UN method for measuring national GHG emissions is 
based on territory emissions only, for example an iPhone’s 
materials are sourced from different parts of the globe 
and manufactured in China. The GHG emissions from the 
production of an iPhone used in Ireland, are not 
associated with Ireland’s GHG emissions as the emissions 
were not produced in Ireland’s territory. But 
consumption-based emissions would account for this. 
Denmark plan to include policy initiatives which can 
contribute to reducing the total climate footprint of 
imported goods, thereby reducing global emissions. 
However, the consumption footprint is not included in 
meeting the target [25]. Should and if so, how should 
Ireland incorporate consideration of with consumption-
based emissions
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